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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

INFORM INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GOOGLE LLC;
GOOGLE INC.;
ALPHABET INC.;
YOUTUBE, LLC;
YOUTUBE, INC.;
and JOHN DOES 1-100;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL ACTION FILE

NO. ______________________

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Inform, Inc. (“Inform”), by and through its attorneys, brings this
action against Defendants Google LLC, Google Inc., Alphabet Inc., YouTube,
LLC, YouTube, Inc., and John Does 1-100 (collectively “Defendants” or
“Google”). Inform makes its allegations upon personal knowledge as to its own
acts and upon information and belief as to all other matters, as well as based upon
the ongoing investigation of its counsel. Plaintiff respectfully shows the Court as
follows:
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I.

INTRODUCTION
1.

This is an action under, inter alia, the Sherman Antitrust Act, the

Clayton Antitrust Act, and Georgia’s common law tort of tortious interference to
restrain the anticompetitive conduct of Defendants, to remedy the effects of the
Defendants’ past unlawful conduct, to protect free market competition from
continued unlawful manipulation, and to remedy harm to consumers and competitors
alike.
2.

Plaintiff Inform is a digital media advertising company that for over a

decade has directly competed with Google in the online advertising market,
specifically online video advertising, by providing a platform of services to online
publishers, content creators, and online advertisers. While Inform had revenues in
excess of $100 million for its online advertising services between 2014 and 2016,
since that time Google has effectively put Inform out of business as a direct result of
the illegal conduct described herein. Google’s pattern of anticompetitive practices
has thwarted competition on the merits and excluded Inform and other Google
competitors from the relevant markets. The result has been to eviscerate competition
in multiple markets, harm consumers, degrade consumer choice and consumer
privacy, and stifle innovation.

2
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3.

At its core, Google is in the business of online advertising, services from

which it derives the vast majority of its revenues. Users of the Google search engine
do not pay a monetary fee; rather Google monetizes users’ personal data to drive
online advertising revenue. In essence, Google is a broker of Internet user data for
online advertising profits.
4.

For many years, Google’s goal has been to monopolize the online

advertising market by: (1) amassing and controlling Internet user data; (2)
controlling the devices and tools with which users access the Internet; and (3)
ultimately controlling the advertising content that is served and consumed by
Internet users.
5.

Google, the world's largest and most accessed search engine, has an

overwhelming market dominance – well over 90% – in Internet Search and other
related markets. For many years now, Defendants have possessed and still possess
monopoly power in this search engine market (hereinafter the “Internet Search
Market”) and numerous interrelated and overlapping markets, including but not
limited to the Search Advertising Market and the Ad Server Market. Google is also
dominant in the Web Browser Market and the broader Online Advertising Market.
Additionally, through its 2005 acquisition of the Android operating system (“OS”),
and the resulting control over handheld Android devices, Google has established a
monopoly in the worldwide market for Licensable Mobile Device Operating
3
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Systems. Collectively, the markets as described above have been leveraged by
Google to gain and maintain monopoly power and will be referred to herein as
“Defendants’ Leveraged Monopolies.”
6.

To maximize their advertising profits, to protect their valuable

monopolies against potential competitive threats, and to extend Defendants’
Leveraged Monopolies globally and across digital devices, Defendants have
simultaneously engaged in a series of acquisitions and anticompetitive activities
designed to thwart competition on the merits.
7.

To maintain their monopolies and gain additional monopoly power,

Defendants have resorted to blatant and rampant coercive and anticompetitive
activities. Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct includes:
 coercing consumers to use Google’s products and services;
 coercing advertisers to use Google’s products and services;
 illegally undermining competitive products and services;
 entering agreements tying other Google products, services and
applications to the Android operating systems (OS) offered by
Google and/or to the Google Ad Server;
 entering into exclusionary agreements that preclude companies from
advertising, distributing, promoting, buying, or using products of
competitors or potential competitors to Google’s applications;
4
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 entering into exclusionary agreements that restrict the right of
companies to provide services or resources to competitors or
potential competitors to Google's advertising services and products;
 tortiously interfering with competitors’ contracts and business
relationships;
 maliciously and artificially imposing restrictions on how ads can be
supported and accepted for display, while exempting or whitelisting
its own platforms from these rules;
 improperly influencing and infiltrating governmental agencies,
including the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to further Google’s
interests; and
 engaging in a decades-long campaign to acquire disparate tech
companies and patent portfolios with the goal of leveraging its
monopoly power to maintain market dominance throughout
Defendants’ Leveraged Monopolies.
Defendants’ conduct described above shall be referred to herein as “Defendants’
Competitive Restraints.”
8.

Defendants have illegally leveraged their monopoly power and market

dominance in interrelated markets both to maintain dominance in those markets
5
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already monopolized by Google (e.g., Internet Search Market, Search Advertising
Market, Ad Server Market, and the Licensable Mobile Device Operating Systems
Market), as well as to gain further dominance in related markets like the Web
Browser Market and the broader Online Advertising Market.
9.

This case is not the first time Google’s illegal monopolistic behavior has

been challenged. In fact, there already exists a lengthy public record detailing
Google’s illegal activities, including but not limited to the following:
 June 2010: French regulators found that Google had abused its dominant
position in the Internet advertising market when it barred a location data
company from using its AdWords service.
 November 2010: The European Commission announces an investigation
into whether Google abused a dominant market position in online search by
allegedly lowering or downgrading the search results of competing services
and by giving preferential placement to the results of its own vertical search
services in order to shut out competing services.
 November 2010: The Commission also announced that it will also look
into allegations that Google lowered the 'Quality Score' for sponsored links
of competing vertical search services – one of the factors that determine the
price paid to Google by advertisers. (Comparison Shopping Investigation)

6
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 April 2011: Daum Communications files antitrust complaints with the
South Korean Fair Trade Commission, asserting that Google blocked them
from putting their search applications on Android phones in South Korea,
where Samsung and LG Android phones are manufactured.
 June 2011: The FTC launches an antitrust investigation against Google for
abusing its monopoly power and anticompetitive practices, focused on,
inter alia, whether Google unfairly ranks search results to favor its own
businesses; whether exclusive agreements to provide search services to
online publishers and other Web sites hurt competition; whether Google
abused its monopoly in the search engine market to increase advertising
rates for competitors and made it difficult for advertisers to compare
advertising data running on rival sites such as Yahoo and Microsoft’s Bing;
and whether the company used control of the Android mobile operating
system to pre-install Google’s bundled default apps and to discourage
smartphone and other mobile device manufacturers from using rivals’
applications.
 June 2011: The FTC also looks at whether Google violated the FRAND
Agreement signed by Motorola Mobility when it acquired 17,000 of the
Motorola’s standard essential patents SEPs (and 7,000 pending
applications) that are crucial to device interoperability – by not licensing
7
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the patents to rivals, willing licensees, and competitors on fair, reasonable,
and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND).
 August 2012: The FTC announces that Google agreed to pay $22.5 million
to settle the FTC's charges that Google "placed an advertising tracking
cookie on the computers of Safari users who visited sites within Google's
DoubleClick advertising network.”
 August 2012: After several years of investigation, an FTC staff report
recommends prosecuting Google for anticompetitive practices related to
scraping, exclusive deals, and restricting advertisers’ ability to run
advertising campaigns on competitors’ search engines.
 July 2013: The FTC finalizes settlement in Google Motorola Mobility case
for excluding competitors on Android technology, indicating that Google
violated the FRAND Agreement.
 April 2015: The European Commission opens a separate investigation on
whether Google has entered into anti-competitive agreements or abused its
monopoly in the mobile device operating system market, to pre-install
Google search, Google Chrome, and a host of other Google software as
default apps in mobile devices and to make it difficult for competing thirdparty apps and search engines to be pre-installed on mobile devices
operating on Google Android.
8
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 July 2016: The European Commission announces it will also investigate
whether Google abused its market dominance to prevent competing
advertising companies to sell ads to web sites already using Google
AdSense.
 April 2017: In a settlement with Russia’s Federal Antimonopoly Service,
Google agrees to pay US $7.8 million in fines and rewrite contracts with
smartphone manufacturers under a settlement over access to the Android
operating system. The settlement ended a two-year legal battle after
regulators — acting on a complaint filed by Yandex, Google’s main
competitor in Russia — found that Google apps were being given
prominence over rivals on Android-based smartphones.
 June 2017: Google is fined with a record $2.7 billion by the European
Commission for manipulating search results.
 July 2018: The European Commission fines Google with another record
$5.1 billion in Android antitrust case for, inter alia, illegally tying of
Google's search and browser apps; illegally making anticompetitive
payments conditional on exclusive pre-installation of Google Search; and
illegal obstructing of development and distribution of competing Android
operating systems.

9
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 March 2019: The European Commission fines Google $1.7 billion for
abusive antitrust online advertising activities in imposing a number of
restrictive clauses in the AdSense contracts with third-party websites which
prevented Google's rivals from placing their search advertisements on these
websites.
 June 2019: The U.S. Justice Department announces that it will launch an
antitrust investigation against Google, which prompts the company to file
an SEC regulatory filing stating that the DOJ has requested all documents
related to Google’s previous antitrust investigations and convictions here in
the U.S. and elsewhere.
 September 2019: Google faces a host of antitrust investigations by 50 U.S.
states. Led by Texas, the state attorney generals signed onto an antitrust
investigation into Google search and search advertising businesses.
10. Defendants’ illegal actions described herein are concerted attempts to
maintain inextricably intertwined monopolies and to achieve dominance in other
markets, not by innovation and other competition on the merits, but rather by selfserving and Google-biased manipulation of search algorithms, illegal tie-ins,
exclusive dealing contracts, predatory pricing, manipulation of the patent process,
tortious interference with competitors’ contracts and business relationships,
selective blocking of software applications, and other anticompetitive tactics that
10
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deter innovation, exclude competition, and rob customers of their right to choose
among competing alternatives.
II.

THE PARTIES
11. Plaintiff Inform, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “Inform”) is a Delaware corporation

with a principal place of business located at 3445 Peachtree Road NE, Suite 1000,
Atlanta, GA, 30326. Inform was formerly known as News Distribution Network,
Inc. (“NDN”). Plaintiff is a digital media advertising company that provides a
platform of services to online publishers, content creators, and online advertisers.
12. Defendant Google Inc. incorporated in California in September 1998
and reincorporated in Delaware in August 2003. In or around 2017, Google changed
from a corporation to a limited liability company (LLC) under the umbrella of
Alphabet Inc. Defendant Google LLC is a Delaware Limited Liability Company
with its principal place of business at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway in Mountain View
California. Google is the world leader in general Internet search conducted on all
devices and in handheld general search. It also is the owner of the Android OS and
popular and exclusive mobile and tablet applications including YouTube, Google
Maps, and Gmail. In 2018, Google’s annual revenues topped $136 billion, the vast
majority of which was derived from online advertising.
13. Defendant Alphabet Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters
and principal place of business at the “Googleplex” in Mountain View, California.
11
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Defendant Alphabet is one of the top ten largest companies in the United States with
more than $100 billion in annual revenue. Alphabet, ranking 15th in the list of
Fortune 500 companies, is traded on the NASDAQ under the symbol “GOOGL” and
is included in the S&P 100 Index. Alphabet beat revenue expectations with $40.5
billion in the most recent quarter, Q3 2019. For Q3 2019, advertising revenue hit a
record $33.9 billion.
14. Defendant YouTube, Inc. registered as a corporation in the State of
Delaware in October 2005 and was converted into YouTube, LLC a year later.
Defendant YouTube, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Google LLC. YouTube
is headquartered in San Bruno, California.
15. Defendants and Inform are competitors in several markets, including the
Online Advertising Market, and specifically in online video advertising.

As

discussed below, Google provides services similar to Inform through a stable of
advertising products and applications including, without limitation, Google Ads, the
AdSense program, AdX, DoubleClick for Publishers (DFP) and Google Ad
Manager.
III.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
16. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.,
and Sections 3, 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 15 and 26, because
12
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Plaintiff alleges violations of federal law. The Court also has supplemental
jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
17. Venue is proper in this district under 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22, and 26 and
under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) because: (1) Google transacts business and is
found within this district, (2) Inform’s principal place of business is in this district;
and (3) a substantial portion of the events giving rise to this claim herein occurred
within this district.
IV.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.
18.

The Advent of Online Advertising
When the Internet started to become more popular in the early 1990s,

traditional print publishers established websites and began to publish their
substantive content online. This created vast amounts of news and other content on
the Internet and opened the door to digital or online advertising and a new means of
generating advertising profits through display and video advertisements.
19.

Like other advertising medium, online advertising often includes: (1) a

publisher, who integrates advertisements into its online content; (2) an advertiser,
who provides the advertisements to be displayed; and (3) advertising agencies that
help create and place the ads. The goal of online advertising generally is to put an
advertisement in front of the best possible audience for that ad. A view of the ad by
a user is commonly referred to as an impression.
13
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20.

During the early years of online advertising, the buying and selling of

ads between an advertiser and a publisher was a direct and manual process whereby
publishers sold advertising space directly to advertisers through what are known as
“direct ad campaigns.” However, with the speed and growing popularity of the
Internet, publishers needed a more efficient and easier way to manage the various
advertisers’ campaigns that ran on the publisher’s website – an ad server.
21.

An ad server is a piece of advertising technology (AdTech) that is used

by publishers, advertisers, ad agencies, and ad networks to manage and run online
advertising campaigns. Ad servers are responsible for making the instantaneous
decisions about what ads to show on a website, and then serving the ad onto that site.
Additionally, ad servers collect and report data (such as impressions and clicks) for
advertisers to gain insights from and monitor the performance of their ads. In the
same way WordPress is used to manage a website’s content, ad servers are used to
manage and display online advertising content to the right user on a website.
22. There are two main types of ad servers: a publisher’s ad server (also
called a first-party ad server) and an advertiser’s ad server (or a third-party ad
server). One such third-party ad server is Google’s Double Click for Publishers
(“DFP”).

14
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23. First-party ad servers allow website publishers to manage the ad space
or ad slots on their own website and to display direct ad campaigns sold by the
publisher to the advertiser.
24. When direct ad campaigns are not available, the first-party ad server will
fill the ad space by serving ads from a third-party ad server, a supply side platform
(“SSP”) or an ad network.
25. The first-party ad server will: determine which ads to display on the
publisher’s website based on collected user data and preferences; serve the ad to the
user; and collect and report data such as impressions and clicks, which can be used
to determine the cost to the advertiser.
26. The primary function of the first-party ad server is to fill ad space on the
publisher’s website that is tailored to the interests of the particular user visiting the
publisher’s website.
27. A first-party ad server works as follows1: A user visits the publisher’s
website and the Internet browser (e.g., Google Chrome or Safari) sends a request to
the publisher’s web server asking for the page’s content to be displayed. The
publisher’s web server returns the HTML (or hypertext markup language) and it
starts rendering the page’s content. Simultaneously, an ad request is sent to the

See What is an Ad Server and How Does it Work, Maciej Zawadzinski,
https://clearcode.cc/blog/what-is-an-ad-server/.
1
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publisher’s ad server to fill the ad space or ad slot, which is a space left blank on the
displayed page to be populated by advertisements that are tailored to the user’s
interests.

The publisher’s ad server chooses an ad campaign based on the

information obtained by the publisher about that user. The publisher’s ad server then
sends back the JavaScript tag to the publisher’s website and the relevant ad is
displayed to the user.
28. Third-party ad servers are similar but work somewhat differently. In
addition to serving ads, a third-party ad server also aggregates campaign data across
multiple publishers, which advertisers can then use to analyze the performance of
their ad campaigns and verify reports from the publishers.
29. A third-party ad server works as follows: A user visits the publisher’s
website and the Internet browser (e.g., Google Chrome) sends a request to the
publisher’s web server asking for the page’s content to be displayed. The publisher’s
web server returns the HTML (or hypertext markup language) and it starts rendering
the page’s content. Simultaneously, an ad request is sent to the publisher’s ad server
to fill the ad space or ad slot, which is a space left blank on the displayed page to be
populated by advertisements that are tailored to the user’s interests. The publisher’s
ad server chooses an ad campaign based on the information obtained by the publisher
about that user. The publisher’s ad server then sends back an ad markup (or the code
that is inserted into the ad slot) that contains a URL that points to the advertiser’s ad
16
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server. The ad markup (or code) sends off a request to the advertiser’s ad server for
the ad markup (or code) and counts an impression. The advertiser’s ad server then
sends the markup to the publisher’s website and an ad from the third-party ad server
is displayed to the user.
30. When a third-party ad server is used, the third-party ad server will:
determine which ads to display on the publisher’s website based on collected user
data and preferences across publishers; serve the ad to the user; and collect and report
data such as impressions and clicks, which can be used to determine the cost to the
advertiser.
B.

The Early Days of Google

31. Google is a multinational technology company based in the United
States, specializing in Internet-related services and products that include online
advertising technologies, search, cloud computing, software and hardware. Google
offers various services in every district in the United States and throughout the
world.
32. Google Inc. was founded in 1998 by Sergey Brin and Larry
Page. Google began as an online search firm and was established as a two-sided
platform that enabled users to search the Internet. While the first-generation of
search engines simply indexed the content of web pages, Google and Google’s
PageRank algorithm helped define second-generation search technology, which
17
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looked at links to and from other Web pages as a way of determining
relevance. Third-generation search engines go well beyond the link analysis and use
intelligent clustering of results, natural language processing, and more human input
to improve search results for users.
33. As Google’s dominance in Internet search began to grow, its product
and service offerings diversified into several overlapping markets intended to
leverage its increasing monopoly power. These markets included email, document
creation, mobile phones and Internet advertising. One commentator noted:
As the gateway to the Internet for the vast majority of users, Google
has unparalleled influence over which content and services people
discover, read, and use. Before Google’s need for growth compelled
it to look beyond horizontal search, this unfettered market power
wasn't necessarily a problem. Google tended to focus its efforts on
providing the best possible search results for its users, even though
that usually meant steering them to other people’s websites as
quickly as possible. Starting around 2005, however, Google began to
develop a significant conflicting interest—to steer users, not to other
people’s services, but to its own growing stable of competing
services, in price comparison, travel search, social networking,
[news], video content and so on.2

2

One of the earliest complainants against Google’s anticompetitive behavior was
from a comparison shopping service called, Foundem. In their various submissions
to antitrust enforcement authorities, Foundem succinctly lays out Google’s
dominance and the effect of its abuse of monopoly power. See
http://www.searchneutrality.org/search-neutrality/the-real-search-neutrality.
18
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C.

Google’s Business Is Online Advertising.

34. Google operated at a loss for the first two years it operated. In 2000,
Google began selling text-based advertisements associated with search keywords,
turning its first profits in 2001 with a net income of approximately $7 million. Since
that time, Google’s ad offerings have become considerably more sophisticated,
resulting in tens of billions of dollars of annual revenue. These services now include,
inter alia, search campaigns, display campaigns and video campaigns, which can be
implemented and viewed across multiple devices.
35. Google’s ad-based revenue model entails creating and selling ads for a
specific website, service, app, or other product or service and placing them on
strategic, high traffic channels based upon Google’s proprietary algorithms and
Google’s stable of advertising offerings, including Google Ads, AdSense, AdX,
DFP, Google Ad Manager and other tools. Today, Google’s ad-based revenue
model generates the vast majority of Google’s revenues, yielding billions in revenue
each year as reflected in the following chart:

19
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For Q3 2019, the most recent quarter, advertising revenue hit a record $33.9
billion.
D.

Google is A Broker of User Data for Online Advertising Profits.

36. The multisided nature of Google’s platform, which connects distinct but
interdependent demands, offers Internet users a service purportedly “free of charge.”
This consumer strategy has been an advantageous commercial strategy because it
attracts users, which are a critical asset to Google because it allows the platform to
sell advertising space to companies that are interested in reaching those users. In
this way, Google connects users’ demand for information, products, and services
with advertisers’ and publishers’ demand for access to those users.
37. Thus, Google does not charge a monetary fee to Internet users for its
search service either by way of subscription fees or usage fees, but rather its business
model is based upon generating advertising revenue with advertisers appearing in or
20
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near the search results or on the webpages listed in the search results. While
Google’s dominant business model suggests that users receive “free” access to
services, the exchange in fact is for the commercial use of an individual’s personal
data. This user data is critical for attracting advertisers who fund Google through
billions of dollars in advertising revenue. In essence, Google is a broker of user data
for advertising profits.
38. Despite not charging a specific monetary fee to users in the form of
fiat currency or the like, Google receives value from every platform user in the form
of, inter alia, personally identifiable information, user impressions and preferences,
and insight into patterns, timing, trends, location and demographics. Google then
stores and monetizes this data through its proprietary algorithms.3

3

See Commission decision of 27 June 2017 in Case 38606 - AT.39740 Google
Search (Shopping), (the “EU Shopping Decision”) at ¶158 stating:
[E]ven though users do not pay a monetary consideration for the use
of general search services, they contribute to the monetization of the
service by providing data with each query. In most cases, a user
entering a query enters into a contractual relationship with the
operator of the general search service. For instance, Google’s Terms
of Service provide: ‘By using our Services, you agree that Google can
use such data in accordance with our privacy policies.’. . . . The data
which users agree to allow a general search engine to store and re-use
is of value to the provider of the general search service as it is used to
improve the relevance of the search service and to show more relevant
advertising.”
See also What’s The Value Of Your Data? Tech Crunch, October 13, 2015, Pauline
Glikman, Nicolas Glady (“Data has become the most important strategic asset of
pure players like Google and Facebook. And among the biggest companies in the
21
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39. Information generally, and personally identifiable information
specifically, has become widely accepted as payment for goods and services. Users
are no less paying customers simply because the medium of exchange is information
and personal data rather than legal tender or banknotes.
E.

Understanding Google’s Business Lines and How They Feed Into
Google’s Billion Dollar Advertising Business
1. Google Search

40.
Search,

Google’s flagship online service is its general search engine, Google
which

is

accessible

either

through

Google’s

main

website

(www.google.com) or through localized websites. A search engine is a web-based
tool that allows users to locate information on the Internet. Search engines, such as
Google, Yahoo, Baidu and Bing, utilize automated software applications (referred
to as robots, bots, or spiders) that travel along the Web and gather information used
to create a searchable index of websites.
41.

Each search engine uses different complex mathematical formulas to

generate search results. The results for a specific query are then displayed on the
search engine results page (or “SERP”). These search engine algorithms take the
key elements of a web page, including the page title, content, key word density,

world, by market capitalization, a majority see their valuation estimated as a
function of their user base and the data they collect.”).
22
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number of linked web pages, and determine where to place the results on the page.
For websites seeking web traffic and/or seeking to sell products and services, where
they rank on the SERP are dispositive of the website’s exposure, readership, sales,
profits and ultimately can make or break the viability of the website and the
underlying company. Notably, each search engine’s algorithm is unique so ranking
at the top of one (e.g., Yahoo) does not guarantee a prominent ranking on another
search engine (e.g., Google), even when results are organic.
42.

Google Search is ubiquitous, existing for static devices (personal

computers and laptops), for handheld and mobile devices (smartphones and tablets),
and for other smart devices, such as Google Home or devices running Android TV
or Android Auto operating systems. Additionally, Google also powers other search
engines – including Ask, which is the sixth largest search engine in the world.

43.

General search engines (also called horizontal search engines), such as

Google or Bing!, ostensibly compete along zero-cost bases or with non-price
parameters of competition such as: the relevance of results; the speed with which
results are provided; the attractiveness of the user interface; the depth of indexing of
the web; and the volume of users feeding data into the network. As user data is
ingested and analyzed by the search engines to improve their performance, garnering
the most users is critical to competing in these areas.

23
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2.

Generic Search Results

44. When a user enters a keyword or a string of keywords (a “query”) in
Google Search, Google’s general search results pages return different categories of
search results, including (1) generic search results; (2) specialized search results; and
(3) online search advertisements.
45. Generic search results typically appear on the left side of Google’s
general search results pages in the form of blue links with short excerpts (“snippets”)
in order of their rank. Generic search results can link to any page on the Internet,
including web pages of specialized search services that compete with Google's own
specialized search services.
46. To rank generic search results in response to a query, Google uses
algorithms, including an algorithm called PageRank. PageRank ostensibly measures
the importance of a web page based on the interest in the page, as well as the number
and quality of links to that page, the underlying assumption being that more
important websites are likely to receive more links from other websites. Google
applies a variety of adjustment mechanisms to the results of PageRank, which
adjustments are determined by Google. Through PageRank and the adjustment
mechanisms, Google determines and can manipulate the rank of a web page in
generic search results on Google's general search results pages.

24
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47. By way of example, in response to a search query – on Google.com or
on one of Google’s syndicated search boxes on third party websites – Google returns
search results pages with a list of generic or “algorithmic” results (typically on the
left side of the screen) and, where applicable, a list of paid search advertising or
“sponsored links” (typically on the top and/or right-side). Paid ads that appear
interspersed in the search results are denoted as such with a tiny box just under the
title (and next to the link) that indicates “Ad.” Below is an example:

25
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48. This is also typically referred to as a “horizontal search,” as opposed to
a “vertical search.” Horizontal search results are selected on the basis of an
algorithm that is applied horizontally across the entire Internet and is
primarily designed to provide the most relevant pages. Vertical search results are
selected from a smaller, more specific group of sites (e.g., travel-related sites, foodrelated sites), often listed in a database that is separate from the index of the Internet
from which horizontal search results are selected. Vertical search engines include
Expedia, Amazon, and Google’s own Google Images and Google Shopping.
49. Through this generic search process, Google has attained monopoly
status in the Search Advertising Market. Google has also been the subject of antitrust
enforcement and private actions for their manipulation of vertical search results,
such as the comparison shopping services, discussed below.
3.
50.

AdSense, Google Ads (Formerly AdWords), DFP and AdX

As users browse Google Search, use Google mobile apps, read Gmail,

watch YouTube or shop online, the user sees paid advertisements populated by
Google. Google utilizes consumers’ personal data to customize these ads based on
the user’s information, preferences and online activity.
51.

AdSense and Google Ads (formerly AdWords) are two advertising

platforms offered by Google. The fundamental difference between AdSense and
Google Ads is who they are designed for: Google Ads is for advertisers while
26
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AdSense is for content publishers, or website owners. While Google Ads is used
to buy advertising from Google, AdSense is used to sell advertising space to Google.
AdWords

enables

businesses

and

marketers

to advertise

on

Google’s

network (search, display, etc.). AdSense enables publishers to reserve space for the
placement of Google Ads on their own website (via text, video, or images) and
thereby monetize their own website content. In this way, Google Ads and AdSense
promote Google’s greater advertising network: website owners put up space for
Google’s ads (AdSense) and businesses set budgets and create ads to display on
Google’s advertising network (Google Ads).
52.

Google AdX (aka Google Ad Exchange, aka DoubleClick Ad

Exchange) is an ad exchange network that connects publishers, advertisers and
advertising agencies. AdX primarily focuses on providing real-time biddings,
private auctions, and preferred deals. AdX is essentially a real-time marketplace for
premium advertisers and premium publishers. AdX works with the Google Display
Network (GDN), Google’s ad network of publishers and suppliers.
53. Although Google touts that AdSense as a “free” service, just as end users
provide their personal information and data, website owners pay for this “free”
AdSense service by providing their own websites “real estate,” i.e., blank spaces on
their websites that Google can then populate with paid for advertising; by enabling
Google to trade on their names, good and services; by driving web traffic to the
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Google platform; and by essentially providing digital client lists to Google for
further data mining and monetization. Additionally, Google takes a piece of the
profit paid by the advertiser to the website owner.
4.

Google Ads and The Auction Bidding Market

54. Google Ads is an online advertising program that enables businesses to
promote their products and services on Google Search, YouTube, and on other thirdparty sites that use Google’s AdSense offering.
55. Google Ads works by displaying a provider’s ad when people search
online for the products and services that provider offers. Google Ads is powered by
an auction bidding market. Each time an ad is eligible to appear for a search, it goes
through the ad auction. The auction determines whether the ad actually shows and
in which ad position it will show on the page. To gain the top spot in Google
advertisements, advertisers have to outbid each other. Higher bids move up the list,
while low bids may not even be displayed at all.
56. Cost per impression (or “CPI”) is the cost or expense incurred for each
potential customer who views the advertisement, while cost per thousand
impressions (or “CPM”) refers to the cost or expense incurred for every thousand
potential customers who view the advertisement. CPI, along with pay-perclick (PPC) and cost per order, are used to assess the cost-effectiveness and
profitability of online advertising.
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57. When a user clicks on an AdWords result, Google receives remuneration
for that click from the advertiser owning the website to which the user is directed
(the “pay per click” system). Advertisers pay Google each time a visitor clicks on
an advertisement. A click can be worth anywhere from a few cents to over $50 for
highly competitive search terms.
58. How often an ad shows, its position on the page, and how much the
ad costs are all purportedly driven by two factors: the advertiser’s bid and the
projected quality of the ads (via a subjective “Quality Score”). However, other
factors determined by Google, including acceptable and bespoke minimum bids, are
also accounted for in the determining the winning bid. In several lawsuits, Google
was accused of setting competitors bids astronomically high such that bidding by
these competing advertisers became impossible.
59. While this process is held out by Google to be neutral and unbiased,
Google alone controls the algorithms that generate Google Ads results, the Quality
Score assigned to the search advertisements, and the minimum bids that a given
advertiser can offer in the auction. As a result, the changing or selective application
of Google’s auction process and/or algorithms can effectively box out competition
and limit consumer choice on what it may or may not be purchased, and from whom,
based upon what advertisements “win” the auction.
60. The three most common Google Ads campaign types are:
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 Search campaigns - usually in text form, these ads show on Google
Search results pages when the user searches for a particular product
or service;
 Display campaigns - usually in image form, these ads appear on
websites or apps that consumers visit; and
 Video campaigns – these are digital advertisements, usually 6 or 15
second videos, that show right before or during YouTube content.
61. Google’s video campaigns can run in a number of formats, including:
in-stream ads, video discovery ads, non-skippable in-stream ads, outstream ads, and
bumper ads.
62. Specifically, in-stream ads run before, during, or after other videos on
YouTube or across the Google network sites, games, or apps. These ads may also
run on YouTube videos that are embedded on other sites.
5.

DFP and DoubleClick Ad Exchange (AdX)

63. Google has usurped a monopoly in the Ad Server Market with DFP, or
DoubleClick for Publishers. On Google’s DFP, advertisers upload advertiser/ad
network creative advertisements and tags (HTML codes that call other ad networks
and exchanges for ads). When there is an opportunity (or an ad call), DFP selects
which ad will be served based upon the accumulated data and preferences of the
individual user.

Thus, through the DFP Ad Server monopoly, Google
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instantaneously controls the vast majority of how, when, where and which ads are
served to users on the Internet. A recent Wall Street Journal article, entitled How
Google Edged Out Rivals and Built the World’s Dominant Ad Machine: A Visual
Guide, lays out the inner workings of Google’s multi-billion dollar advertising
conglomerate.4
64. Similar to Ad Sense, AdX is Google’s auction-based system for
premium websites to be paired with premium advertisers. Google AdX is more
exclusive and can be accessed in two ways. First, one could obtain a Google Ad
Manager account and then get Google’s approval to access the AdX account.
Alternatively, AdX can be accessed by working with a Google Certified Publishing
Partner, through which a publisher can obtain a subsidiary AdX account. In both
cases, only large publishers approved by Google can use AdX.
65. In June 2018, Google underwent a major rebranding of its ad platform.
Google has now tied its DFP Ad Server with AdX under a single tool, Google Ad
Manager, as follows:

How Google Edged Out Rivals and Built the World’s Dominant Ad Machine: A
Visual Guide, Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2019,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-google-edged-out-rivals-and-built-the-worldsdominant-ad-machine-a-visual-guide11573142071?shareToken=stb7cf93601f9a42f1b95bff7b376ff5de&reflink=share_
mobilewebshare.

4
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This express tying of services has not yet been addressed by antitrust enforcement
agencies.
6.
66.

YouTube

YouTube is a video-sharing website that allows users to upload, view,

rate, share, add to playlists, report, comment on videos, and subscribe to other users’
content. Created by three former PayPal employees in February 2005, YouTube was
acquired by Google in November 2006 for $1.65 billion and now operates as a
Google subsidiary.
67.

Approximately 1.3 billion people use YouTube. Now the second most

visited website in the world, YouTube gets over 30 million visitors per day, who
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watch an estimated 5 billion videos each day. Three hundred hours of video are
uploaded to YouTube every minute.5
68.

YouTube and selected content creators earn advertising revenue from

Google AdSense. Like most other Google properties, YouTube earns the bulk of its
revenue through advertisements.6 YouTube is estimated to generate between $16
billion and $25 billion in annual revenue, putting it in the top half of the Fortune
500.7
7.
69.

Android Operating System

As set forth above, Google obtains the vast majority of its revenue via

advertising in connection with its flagship product, the Google Search Engine. The
company understood early on that the shift from desktop PCs to mobile Internet,
which started in the mid-2000s, would be a fundamental change for Google Search
and would provide access to emerging and third-world markets, where mobile
devices are significantly more prevalent. To solidify Google’s market dominance in
the Search Advertising and Online Advertising Markets, Google developed a
strategy to anticipate the effects of this shift and to make sure that users would
continue to use Google Search on their mobile devices.

https://merchdope.com/youtube-stats/.
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/053015/how-youtubemakes-money-videos.asp.
7
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24/technology/youtube-financial-disclosuregoogle.html.
5
6
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70.

In 2005, Google bought the original developer of the Android mobile

operating system and has continued to develop Android and to acquire Androidrelevant patents since that time. Today, about 76.2% of smart mobile devices
worldwide run on the Android OS.8 In addition to cell phones and tablets, versions
of the Android OS can also be found on smart home devices, such as Google Home
and TV set top boxes, and even in vehicles, with Android Auto.
71.

Now, more than half of the searches on www.google.com are from

mobile devices. Google mobile ads enable providers/merchants to reach potential
customers wherever they are, as users are searching on their mobile devices for what
the merchant offers. Google has touted that 91% of people report that they look up
information on their smartphone when they want to know about, find, do, or buy
something, and that 51% of people have discovered a new company or product while
searching on their mobile phones.
72. Notably, Android is a licensable smart mobile operating system,
meaning that third-party manufacturers of smart mobile devices can license and run
Android on their devices. As stated above, through its control over Android, Google
is dominant in the worldwide market for Licensable Mobile Device Operating
Systems, with a market share of more than 76.2%. There are high barriers to entry
in part due to network effects: the more popular an OS is, the more developers write

8

https://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/mobile/worldwide.
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apps for that system – which in turn attracts more users. Furthermore, significant
resources are required to develop a successful licensable smart mobile operating
system.
8.

Google Chrome

73. Google’s Chrome web browser (“Google Chrome”) is an Internet
browser

released

by

Google

in

December

2008.

Chrome

includes synchronization with Google products and services and is designed to work
with YouTube and Gmail. Google Chrome is used by over 50% of people in the US
and approximately 67% worldwide.9 Google’s Android OS, discussed below,
requires preinstallation of Google Chrome under certain circumstances, including,
inter alia, as a condition of accessing certain Google apps.
V.

GOOGLE AS A MONOPOLY
74. As set forth below, Google has attained monopoly power in multiple

markets and is marching toward total online and information dominance by
leveraging its monopoly power to both maintain current monopolies and to attempt
to gain monopoly power in corollary markets.
A.

Google’s Growth to Monopolistic Search Engine Market Dominance

75. Over the course of the last two decades, Google has steadily

9

https://netmarketshare.com/browser-market-share, September 2019.
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and systematically grown through acquisition of corollary tech and web application
companies. Since its founding in 1998, Google has acquired more than 227
companies and spending over $27 billion for its top ten acquisitions. Rather than
growing organically, Google has grown through strategic acquisitions to yield
products, manpower, and patent portfolios that directly and indirectly support and
maintain its Internet Search and other monopolies and feeds its online advertising
business revenue.
B.

Key Google Acquisitions

76. In April 2003, Google acquired Applied Semantics for $102 million,
another online advertising and marketing-related acquisition to establish and
maintain Google’s monopoly in the Search Advertising Market. This acquisition
laid the groundwork for Google’s creation of AdSense.
77. In August 2005, Google acquired Android for $50 million, a developer
of an open source mobile device operating system. Google's Android is now the
most-used smartphone operating system in the world. In 2015, the Android OS was
installed on more than 80% of the world’s smartphones. Moreover, Android now
powers tablets, televisions, car systems, video game platforms, and wearable
devices. As discussed below, the smartphones and other mobile devices with the
Android operating system are commonly preinstalled with various Google
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applications such as Google searches, Google Play Store, YouTube, Google Maps
and Gmail as default apps.
78. In October 2006, Google acquired YouTube for $1.65 billion, an online
video-sharing company launched in 2005 that became the fastest growing online
video-sharing platform. Indeed, there is a growing concern from lawmakers and
consumers alike that the video platform has grown too big for Google to control the
content shared on the platform adequately.10 Google acquired the company just over
a year after its launch and it has now become the second largest search engine in the
world — second only to Google. YouTube now generates around $15 billion in
revenue a year, virtually all of which is derived from advertising and accounts for
the second largest revenue stream generated by Google next to its online advertising
business. Moreover, YouTube is steadily becoming more valuable to Google due to
the growing shift of consumer viewership from television to online video. YouTube
is strategically important in strengthening and maintaining Google’s monopoly in
Internet Search, Handheld Internet Search, and Search Advertising, as well as
growing its dominance in the broader Online Advertising Market.

10

In September 2019, Google was fined a record $170 million by the FTC and the
New York Attorney General for violating the federal Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act, or COPPA by illegally gathering children’s data on YouTube.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/technology/google-youtube-fine-ftc.html.
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79. DoubleClick was launched in 1996 as an independent ad software
network firm that specialize in display advertising.

In April 2007, Google

announced its intention to acquire DoubleClick. Following an investigation by the
FTC prompted by antitrust concerns, Google acquired DoubleClick in March 2008
for $3.1 billion. The DoubleClick acquisition was in fact instrumental in cementing
Google’s stronghold in the lucrative online advertising industry. In addition to the
DoubleClick software, Google also acquired the relationships with web publishers,
advertisers and agencies, beating a host of other potential buyers like Microsoft to
the acquisition.

Integrated into AdSense, DoubleClick has been enormously

successful for Google, with about 80% to 90% of Google’s $110 billion revenue in
2017 coming from its advertising business. Since the acquisition by Google,
DoubleClick has further expanded with DoubleClick for Publisher (DFP) and
DoubleClick Ad Exchange.
80. In 2010, shortly after acquiring Double Click, Google acquired AdMob
for $750 million and then began acquiring buyer services, including Invite Media
for a reported $81 million. The combination of deals gave Google unprecedented
positioning in every facet of how ads end up on websites and smartphone apps
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around the world. Though U.S. regulators approved these deals, their worst-case
predictions about Google being too powerful have unfortunately come to pass.11
81. In August 2011, Google acquired Motorola Mobility for $12.5 billion,
a mobile device manufacturer, to establish and maintain and further strengthen
Google’s dominance in the handheld search through its Android OS. Google
acquired Motorola’s smartphone patent portfolio, with more than 20,000 patents on
mobile phones and wireless technologies, for $12.5 billion. In the same year — prior
to the Motorola acquisition — Google spent $4.9 million on the Mondu patent
portfolio of Android-relevant technology. Moreover, Google bought 1,029 patents
related to the Android OS from IBM. See MIT Technology Review, October 2011.
82. In August 2015, Google announced its intention to create a new holding
company, Defendant Alphabet Inc. The reorganization was completed on October
2, 2015. Since that date, Google has been a wholly-owned subsidiary of Alphabet,
which has continued to be the umbrella company for the Internet interests of
Google. Alphabet was formed, according to Google founder Larry Page, to make
Google “cleaner and more accountable,” to improve “the transparency and oversight
of what we’re doing,” and to allow greater control of unrelated companies.
83. In January, Google acquired some of Fossil’s smartwatch technology for

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-antitrust-google-explainer/explaineradvertising-executives-point-to-five-ways-google-stifles-businessidUSKCN1VW2L9.

11
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$40 million. On October 28, 2019, Reuters confirmed that Alphabet is still eyeing
the wearables market by making an offer for Fitbit.
84. With these and other acquisitions, Google has gained monopoly
power in the Internet Search Market, the Market for Licensable Mobile Device
Operating Systems, the Search Advertising Market, and the Ad Server Market. This
power has been leveraged and used to abusively and illegally eviscerate competition
across these and other markets, in which Google has marched toward dominance.
C. Google’s Monopoly in the Relevant Markets
85. Google Search receives over 63,000 searches per second on any given
day, which translates into at least 3.8 million searches per minute, 228 million
searches per hour, 5.6 billion searches per day, and 2 trillion searches per year.
Google’s market share in the various overlapping markets is set forth below.
86. Google has a durable monopoly in each of the following markets:
a.

The General Internet Search Market (“Internet Search
Market”): Google has maintained a monopoly on search
worldwide for nearly a decade, with control over 94 percent of
the search engine market.

The next largest competitor is

Microsoft's Bing, with a market share of about 2.5%. Google’s
overwhelming monopoly in the Internet Search Market has
been previously recognized.
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b.

The Market for Licensable Mobile Device Operating Systems:
Google has approximately 75% market share in global mobile
operating systems12;

12

https://money.cnn.com/gallery/technology/mobile/2013/01/29/smartphonemarket-share/index.html; https://gs.statcounter.com/os-marketshare/mobile/worldwide (citing 76.2% share).
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c.

The Search Advertising Market: Google has approximately
80% market share in the Search Advertising Market, which is
a sub-category of the Online Advertising Market (discussed
below), followed by Microsoft and Yahoo with 7.2% and 2.5%,
respectively.

Additionally,

Google’s

acquisition

of

DoubleClick set the stage for its monopoly in the realm of
digital advertising;
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d.

The Ad Server Market: as early as 2016, Google had
approximately 75% market share in the Ad Server Market13;

13

https://www.businessinsider.my/facebook-winds-down-atlas-ad-server-201611/.
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87. Additionally, Google is achieving monopoly power in the following
additional markets:
a.

The Web Browser Market: Google has effectively achieved

monopoly power in the Browser Market, with an estimated market
share between 61% [May 2019] and 67% [September 2019] and
growing; and

b.

Online Advertising Market: Google dominates the broader

Online Advertising Market with about 40% market share, followed by
Facebook with about 20%.
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88. There is significant interplay among these distinct markets that makes
Google’s monopolistic power in these markets more insidious. In other words,
Google is able to leverage its market dominance in each of these markets in order to
further expand its monopolies in the other related markets to further stamp out
competition. For example, since Google controls some 94% of the Internet Search
Market and 67% of the Browser Market, it can use its monopoly powers to coerce
advertisers to use its search advertising services, including using its video
advertising campaigns over competing video advertisers. Similarly, Google can use
its monopoly power in the Market for Licensable Mobile Device Operating Systems
to help maintain its monopoly in the Internet Search Market and obtain a monopoly
in the Web Browser Market by imposing anticompetitive restrictions in contracts on
device manufacturers and mobile network operators who seek to acquire Google's
proprietary Android apps and services.
89.

These durable markets have significant barriers to entry including, but

not limited to: network effects that make platforms more valuable as they gain more
users; the advantages of big data which enable platforms and companies to use the
treasure trove of data they collect from users to improve the quality of their products
and services; and lock-in effects that cause users to avoid switching platforms or
companies so as not to lose their personal contacts, history of searches, photos, apps,
and other information.
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90.

The visual of Google’s Search Engine Market share can be seen below:

91.

In light of the synergistic effect that Google has acquired from its

antitrust activities in the Internet Search Market, the Search Advertising Market, the
Licensable Mobile Device Operating System Market, and the Ad Server Market —
all connected by an Internet platform that enables Google to gather and monetize
massive consumer data for its targeted and location-specific advertising (which
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accounts for 80% to 90% of Google's total revenue),14 Google's conduct has resulted
in real harm to competition, consumers, and innovation.

Ultimately, and

frighteningly, Google will control all online content – particularly what information
is presented to each individual user. Google’s own trademarked marketing solution
– “Think with Google” – demonstrates Google’s ultimate goal.

92.

Google’s systematic assault on the free market competitive process, as

detailed below, restrains trade, stymies competition, deprives customers of choice,
degrades consumer privacy, degrades quality and variety of products and services
offered to consumers, and stifles innovation. Google’s predatory and anticompetitive
practices are the very conduct that the United States antitrust laws were enacted to
prevent.

The October 28, 2019 Q3 earnings reports indicate that advertising revenue
accounted for $33.9 billion, or 83.7%, of Alphabet’s $40.5 billion in revenue.
14
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VI.

ANTITRUST LAWS
93. Congress passed the first antitrust law, the Sherman Act, in 1890 as

a “comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade.” In 1914, Congress passed two
additional antitrust laws: the Federal Trade Commission Act, which created the FTC,
and the Clayton Act. With some revisions, these are the three core federal antitrust
laws still in effect today.
94.

The Sherman Act is divided into two main sections: Section 1, which

prohibits concerted activity of two or more entities that combine, contract, or
conspire in restraint of trade; and Section 2, which addresses unilateral actions and
prohibits monopolization or attempted monopolization in restraint of trade.
Specifically, Section 2 of the Sherman Act establishes three offenses, commonly
termed “monopolization,” “attempted monopolization,” and “conspiracy to
monopolize.”15
95.

At its core, Section 2 makes it illegal to acquire or maintain monopoly

power through improper means. The long-standing requirement for monopolization
is both (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or

15

See, e.g., 1 Section of Antitrust Law, Am. Bar Ass'n, Antitrust Law
Developments 225, 317 (6th ed. 2007).
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development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident. To be found unlawful, monopoly power must be accompanied by an
element of anticompetitive conduct, often described as “exclusionary” or
“predatory” conduct. This includes both conduct used to acquire a monopoly
unlawfully and conduct used to maintain a monopoly unlawfully.
96.

Section 2 also proscribes “attempt[s] to monopolize.” Establishing

attempted monopolization requires proof (1) that the defendant has engaged in
predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and
(3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.
97.

Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14, prohibits exclusionary

practices, such as tying, exclusive dealing, and predatory pricing, that lessen
competition.

Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, prohibits share

acquisition or mergers that would lessen competition or create a monopoly. The
Clayton Act allows for monetary penalties that are three times as large as the harm
caused by the illegal behavior.
VII. PLAINTIFF INFORM: HISTORY, INNOVATION, AND VALUE
PROPOSITION
98. Inform, formerly known as NDN, is a digital media advertising
company. Inform provides a platform of services to online publishers, content
creators, and online advertisers.
99. Inform specializes in providing data-driven technology solutions for
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the syndication and monetization of contextually relevant video content on publisher
websites. Specifically, Inform manages the distribution and delivery of video from
content creators into articles on newspaper, magazine, radio, and television websites.
In other words, Inform enables publishers to pair corresponding video with their
original text content in order to enhance the user’s experience and understanding of
the publisher’s story. At the same time, Inform’s platform provides brands with an
opportunity to deliver video advertisements to the audience that is most likely to
consume their products.
100. Like Google, Inform works with both publishers (i.e., newspaper,
magazine, radio and television sites, and website operators, like yahoo.com or
msn.com) and advertisers, enabling publishers to monetize their websites by, among
other things, selling space on their web pages to online advertisers.
A.

The Evolution of Inform’s Online Video Advertising

101. With the evolution of online video streaming in or around 2005, there
was growing demand from publishers for video content to enhance and augment their
online text content and thus a growing opportunity for brands to present video
advertisements to consumers. Early on, Inform recognized that video content clips
and video advertisements would become increasing valuable for online publishers,
just as they had been for cable television networks. By embedding video content and
video advertising into a publisher’s articles, Inform could create a better user
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experience and offer video advertising to help monetize website space for online
publishers, the way television commercials monetized air space for cable television
networks.
102. The Inform platform is the tech provider, the substantive content
provider and the advertiser. For example, using the Inform platform in the context
of a newspaper, magazine, radio, or television website, a typical story-level web
page will likely include instream video (within the text of the article near the
headline), outstream video (within the text of the article outside of the user’s initial
view), and right rail video (outside of the text of the article), as shown below:
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103. The video content played in these spaces are video clips, usually one to
three minutes in length, that relate to the publisher’s story or article. In the context
of newspaper, magazine, radio, and television websites, relevant video content is
most often created by a news service, like the Associated Press.
104. Inform established an extensive library of premium video content
that could either be manually selected by the publisher to match the substantive text
content or automatically selected for them by Inform’s content matching technology.
105. Each substantive video clip that plays on a web page presents an
opportunity for a brand, product or service (e.g., Marriot Hotel) to present the user
with a video advertisement. The three ways that Inform enabled and supported video
advertising were through: (1) a pre-roll ad; (2) a video carousel that highlighted the
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trending videos for the publisher; and (3) placement of a display ad, that is a
companion ad to the content posted on the site. A pre-roll ad is a promotional video
message that plays before the substantive video content. These promotional video
messages are often repurposed television ads, sometimes shortened to 10 or 15
seconds. “Pre-roll ads” are particularly valuable because they stand between the
user and substantive video content that the user is seeking to view, which virtually
assures that the advertisement is viewed by the user.
106. Brands often employ advertising agencies to develop an advertising
strategy, create the advertisements themselves, and manage their advertising
spending.

The advertisements themselves are commonly referred to as “the

creative.” As noted, a pre-roll ad is one example of a creative.
107. At its peak, Inform had an inventory of ad space from a network of
approximately 5,000 publishers. This aggregated digital audience allowed Inform
to work with a brand (or the advertising agency representing a brand) to optimize
the placement of its ads and to reach that brand’s specific target demographic.
108. Inform also provides the infrastructure, including the video player,
allowing them to manage the technical delivery of the video for the content creator
and the creative from the advertiser. Inform’s infrastructure also allowed it to collect
third-party data regarding users. Inform’s access to third-party data dramatically
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increases its ability to target specific demographics, driving a significant portion of
the value of the ad to brands.
109. Third-party data is information about the user and his or her online
behavior that is not personally identifying. First-party data, like name, address, and
credit card numbers, is personally identifying.
110. Inform’s platform was extremely valuable to publishers, content
creators, and advertisers. Between 2010 and 2017, Inform garnered revenue of more
than $180,000,000. Indeed, in 2014, Yahoo.com and Inform had a signed term sheet
to for Yahoo to acquire Inform for approximately $375,000,000, an acquisition that
did not ultimately occur. In each of 2014, 2015 and 2016, Inform had annual revenue
of approximately $35,000,000. In 2015, Inform was ranked as the No. 1 Online
News & Information Property by comScore, with 27 million unique monthly viewers
and 230 million videos viewed each month. Unfortunately, Google took notice of
Inform’s competitiveness and decided to take action.
B.

Inform Competes with Google

111. Google and Inform are competitors in the Online Advertising Market,
and specifically in the online video advertising market. Google provides services
similar to Inform through Google Ads, which sells advertising to publishers through
its ad auction, the AdSense program, which places paid for advertising onto third-
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party websites. These third-party websites are paid by Google when users click on
a particular advertisement.
112. Having already firmly established monopolies in the Internet Search
Market, the Search Advertising Market, the Licensable Mobile Device Operating
Systems Market, and the Ad Server Market, Defendants have leveraged these
monopolies and engaged in other anticompetitive conduct in order to gain further
dominance in the broader Online Advertising Market and eviscerate competition on
the merits by Inform and other competitors.
113. Defendants’ monopolies in these markets are critical to the broader the
Online Advertising Market because 94% of consumers use Google’s search engine;
80% of consumers use Google for search advertising; 75% of consumers use
Google’s Android OS to search the Internet and more than 67% of users worldwide
view websites and the associated video advertisements through Google’s Chrome
browser. Thus, in order to compete in the Online Advertising Market, a company’s
services must be compatible with Google’s stable of services and Google’s Chrome
browser. Importantly, this has enabled Google to set arbitrary and anti-competitive
rules by which video content and video advertisements are enabled, viewable and
audible in ways that favor Google and Google’s stable of products and services.
114. Moreover, Google has a monopoly in the Ad Server Market with a near
75% market share. In order to use Google’s AdX service, advertisers and publishers
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are required to use Google’s ad server, Double Click for Publishers (DFP), which is
programed to control how, when, where and to whom paid for advertisements are
served. Smaller, competing ad servers have noted, “The ubiquity of Google’s ad
server provides virtually total control over which ads are shown and monetized for
the majority of the Internet. This control of the ad server is strategically critical to
Google.”16
C. Google’s Manipulation of the Online Advertising Market
115. Google has illegally leveraged its monopoly power through its
algorithms, its arbitrary rules for advertisers and marketers, and certain technological
changes.
116. For example, Flash is a proprietary digital video player developed by
Adobe. For more than a decade, Flash was the standard for playing video on
websites. As such, content and creatives were developed in Flash and online
advertisers’ infrastructure was based on Flash. Moreover, publishers liked using
Flash on their websites because it gave them significant control and flexibility over
the user experience, including how and when videos played. For example, with
Flash, publishers controlled whether a video would start automatically when the web
page loaded. This feature is commonly referred to as “autostart.” It also gave

16

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-antitrust-google-explainer/explaineradvertising-execs-point-to-five-ways-google-stifles-business-idUSKBN1WB2Q1.
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publishers control over whether the video would be accompanied by audio and over
the audio volume.
117. Over the years, Google, and the developers of other web browsers,
raised various concerns with Flash. However, Flash was superior in many respects
and Google’s primary reason for wanting to marginalize Flash was Google’s lack of
control over Abode’s proprietary product. With Adobe Flash enabled in the web
browsers settings, the publishers (as opposed to Google) were able to control how
and when the video content and advertising was delivered to the user.
118. Google’s Chrome browser initially came with Flash pre-loaded. But in
or around 2014, Google began to roll out changes to Chrome designed to maximize
the destruction of any competition and force advertisers to migrate to the Google
advertising network, while keeping its users fixated on Google, Google products and
Google services.
119. In September 2014, Google began offering Flash-to-HTML5 conversion
tools for the Google Display Network17 and DoubleClick Campaign Manager that
would create a backup HTML5 video advertisement to run when Flash was disabled
or otherwise not supported. On January 27, 2015, Google-owned YouTube

The Google Display Network has over 2 million sites and reaches over 90% of
people on the Internet, enabling ads to appear across a large collection of Googlepreferred websites, mobile apps, and video content.

17
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announced that it would no longer be using Adobe Flash by default, but would
instead be using its HTML5 video player by default in Google’s Chrome and other
browsers. By February 2015, Google started to automatically convert Adobe Flash
ads to HTML5. Google automatically converted Flash campaigns, both existing and
new, to HTML5 when the advertiser uploaded their ads through Google’s AdWords,
AdWords Editor, or third-party tools that work with Google’s ad platform.
120. As a result, advertisers that had creatives supported by Adobe Flash
were faced with the Hobson’s choice of converting their content to HTML5 or,
alternatively, migrating to the Google network to reach target users, the latter of
which substantially added to Google’s own advertising revenue. Converting to
HTML5 was a lengthy and costly process, requiring the transcoding of all files and
reaching out to each and every one of an advertiser’s 100s or 1000s of vendors who
had been issued flash tags to change and convert the affected content. At the same
time, to continue to monetize their websites with advertising revenue, publishers
were required to wait until advertisers had either migrated their creatives to Google
products and services or had converted the advertising content to HTML5, both of
which meant forgoing substantial revenues. Alternatively, the publisher themselves
could suspend or sever prior relationships with advertisers and utilize Google’s
platform to fill their inventory with Google’s HTML5-ready creatives. In this way
hundreds of online advertisers and publishers withered and died, while Google and
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YouTube plundered the valuable video advertisements that had supported the
publishers’ websites.
121. Also, in June 2015, Google Chrome began to “intelligently pause” ads
that were supported by Adobe Flash. The feature was rolled out in Chrome’s beta
channel in June 2015 and implemented fully in September 2015. Specifically,
Chrome introduced features to automatically pause Flash content that wasn’t “central
to the webpage” while keeping central content playing without interruption. For
example, the main video that a user wanted to watch was unaffected while animations
on the side, such as video advertising, were paused. Notably, Google admitted that
the feature would pause a lot of plugin content, including “many Flash ads.” At the
time there was considerable concern that HTML5 was not as versatile for users as
Adobe Flash. According to one commentator:
The Flash-pause feature can be seen as yet another move by Google designed
to increase digital dominance under the guise of a user benefit. Google wants
to maintain web monetization dominance . . . .
In the past, Google dealt with threats to its dominance by forcing publishers
into exclusive deals. Now, Google found a more subtle means to the same
end: developing features to ‘protect’ users who don’t understand how the
web works. 18

18

See Google’s New Flash Pause Tool — Are Video Ads Crippled?
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/googles-new-flash-pause-tool-video-ads-crippledvincent-meyer/
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122. On August 9, 2016, Google announced that “Chrome will de-emphasize
Flash in favor of HTML5.”

On or about August 31, 2016, Google Chrome

discontinued the use of Adobe Flash in update 53 of their browser. While the
software could still be enabled through Chrome settings, Google confirmed that,
effective the date of end of life for Flash, Google would completely block Flash from
being able to run under the Chrome browser. Eventually, in 2017, Google changed
Chrome’s default settings to disable Flash entirely.
123. Notably, most creatives were built to run on Adobe Flash. Because the
vast majority of users never change the default settings on their web browser (and
Google enjoyed dominance if not monopoly power with its Chrome browser),
Google’s decision effectively meant that a video (and the associated video
advertisement) presented in Flash would not be seen by an overwhelming majority
of consumers. Instead, users would see a screen similar to the following:
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124. A vast majority of users presented with a screen similar to the above
behaved as anticipated, closing and ignoring it – never seeing the video or the
associated advertisement. Google’s decision to disable Flash in its Chrome default
settings had the immediate effect of foreclosing a very significant portion of online
advertisers from reaching users and target audiences.
125. The only place this did not occur was if advertisers or publishers
migrated to Google’s Display Network and uploaded their ads through AdWords,
AdWords Editor, or third-party tools that worked with Google’s ad platform. Since
Google had quietly been preparing YouTube for the disabling of Flash, YouTube
content and advertising on the YouTube site were likewise unaffected. In order to
achieve their market domination, Google even offered to convert to HTML5 for free
to entice advertisers to migrate to the Google ecosystem.
126. Google’s restrictions on Flash, and the way in which Google
implemented them, dramatically and anticompetitively impacted competing online

61

Case 1:19-cv-05362-JPB Document 1 Filed 11/25/19 Page 62 of 103

advertising platforms and digital publishers and secured a larger share of the Online
Advertising Market for Google. Dozens of digital advertisers and publishers were
severely impacted overnight, including many of Inform’s downstream digital
publishers, sending Inform’s business plummeting. Importantly, the advertising
market share that had been garnered by other online advertising platforms, such as
Inform, went directly to Google. That Google was able to impact so many digital
advertisers and publishers virtually overnight simply reinforced Google’s
dominance and made digital advertisers and publishers all the more vulnerable to
Google’s illegitimate and anticompetitive conduct, forcing them to kowtow to
Google’s arbitrary and anticompetitive rules or likewise face corporate
death. Again, the result was that dozens of previously profitable ad networks,
publishers and advertisers were forced into bankruptcy or fire sales, while Google’s
revenue and market share markedly increased.
D. Through Its Monopoly Power, Google Controls HTML5
127. Another way in which Google illegally leverages its monopoly power is
through its control of the functionality of HTML5, through inter alia the Chrome
web browser.
128. The alternative to using Flash to play video content on websites is
HTML5. HTML 5 is a revision of the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), the
standard programming language for describing the content and appearance of Web
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pages. Unlike earlier versions, HTML5 supports high-level audio and video, rather
than just text content, and is more easily functional on and compatible with mobile
devices.
129. Adobe Flash was a proprietary technology owned by Adobe, and Google
had no control over how it functioned.

However, HTML5 is open source

technology. As such Google has used its monopoly powers to not only set the rules
for how HTML5 will function, but to be the self-declared enforcer of how HTML5
operates. When HTML5 is used to present video content, Google, through Chrome,
has significantly more control over how, when, and what videos are played. For
example, Google controls whether a video will autostart and whether a video will
play with the sound on or off. Google even controls the size of the video player.
130. Google claims to use a calculation called media engagement index
(“MEI”) to determine when and how ads are displayed. The MEI measures an
individual’s propensity to consume media on a particular site. Google Chrome
calculates a media engagement score which is highest on sites where media/video is
played on a regular basis. When Google Chrome determines that that the MEI is
high enough, Google Chrome will allow media playback on autoplay. Google
Chrome only allows this on desktop devices, not on handheld or mobile devices.
This enables Google to allow autoplay when it serves Google.
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131. Moreover, certain Google-owned or preferred sites such as YouTube,
Amazon and Microsoft are whitelisted, and thus algorithmically exempt from the
restrictive Chrome browser settings. Thus, on YouTube, the autostart feature and
sound features remain unrestricted. Effectively, video advertising on YouTube
reaches the Internet user uninterrupted. This favorable treatment by Google of its
own cannot be overstated – as the very purpose of advertising is to be seen and to be
heard by the end user. And, advertisers and brands will necessarily pay to go where
they are sure to been seen and heard by prospective customers.
132. Effectively, through Google’s stable of products and services, Google
can manipulate how, when and where ads are placed; how, where and whether they
are seen; how, where and whether they are heard; and how efficiently and effectively
they are delivered. Moreover, as stated these restrictive rules are altered and/or not
in place for the video advertisements that run in front of Google’s own YouTube
videos.
E.

Google Affirmatively Interferes with Competitors.

133. Google has touted that “Our tools and platforms make it easy for
advertisers and publishers of all sizes to choose whom they want to work with in this
open, interconnected ad system.” According to Google: “Ad tech is a very crowded
field, and Google competes with hundreds of companies, including household names
like Adobe, Amazon, AT&T, Comcast, News Corp and Verizon . . . . Publishers and
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advertisers mix and match technology partners to meet their different needs, creating
both competition and innovation.” However, in reality, Google has directly engaged
in anticompetitive, illegal and deceptive conduct to eviscerate competition and gain
more market share for Google and its own stable of services.
134. Indeed, on or about April 4, 2016, the Google team contacted one of
Inform’s customers, sending them a screenshot to give them a “heads up” when
Inform’s floating video player with that client’s advertisement appeared next to
content that Google misleadingly characterized as objectionable. Google obtained
information about Inform’s customer through Inform’s forced usage of the Google
ad server, took this information to Inform’s customer and used it in an attempt to
convince Inform’s customer that Google offered superior services.

Google’s

malicious conduct caused purposeful interference with Inform, its customers and
business relationships.

On information and belief, this was not an isolated

occurrence.
135. Given the nature and timing of Google’s affirmative actions and
Google’s vast online power, this can hardly be assumed to be an isolated incident.
Google’s purposeful trolling of competitors’ services and content demonstrates
specific anticompetitive intent and an unethical effort to wrongly discredit Google’s
competitors and steal market share.
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VIII. GOOGLE WIELDS MONOPOLY POWER IN MULTIPLE MARKETS
AND HAS ABUSED THAT POWER TO IMPEDE COMPETITION.
136. While there have been a number of prior legal actions alleging that
Google wields monopoly power, many of these cases have struggled to define the
relevant market; to pinpoint the improper means used by Google to maintain its
monopoly power and/or to leverage the same to unlawfully gain monopoly power in
other relevant markets; and to distinguish harm to competitors from the requisite
harm to competition. While the anticompetitive conduct by Google with respect to
any single market in which Google wields monopoly power runs afoul of the
antitrust laws, the totality of Google’s illegal and anticompetitive conduct across
multiple, inter-related markets demonstrates a frightening march to online and
digital dominance.
A.

Monopolistic Leveraging

137. Monopolistic leveraging is the use of monopoly power in one market
to strengthen or gain a monopoly share in another market. Leveraging may be
achieved through many anticompetitive practices including but not limited to
contractual and/or technological tying, bundling, exclusive dealing, and predatory
or below cost pricing. Monopoly leveraging is often used to describe the way in
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which a monopolist in one market uses its power to monopolize or attempt to
monopolize a second market.19
138. Plaintiff alleges that monopoly leveraging by Google includes but is not
limited to the following:
a.

Google has leveraged its monopoly power in the Internet Search

Market, the Licensable Mobile Device Operating System Market and
the Search Advertising Market to maintain monopoly power in those
markets;
b.

Google has leveraged its monopoly power in the Internet Search

Market, the Licensable Mobile Device Operating System Market and
the Search Advertising Market in an attempt to gain monopoly power
in the Web Browser Market and the broader Online Advertising
Market; and
c.

Google has leveraged its monopoly power in the Ad Server

Market and its dominance (and/or monopoly) in the Web Browser

19

See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992)
(holding that the use of monopoly power in a market to strengthen its monopoly
share of another market is a violation of Section 2 and stating that "[t]he second
element of a §2 claim is the use of monopoly power to foreclose competition, to
gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor" (quoting United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)).
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Market in an attempt to gain monopoly power in the broader Online
Advertising Market, including the video advertising market.
B.

Google’s Anticompetitive Behavior

139. Google violates the antitrust laws through a wide range of predatory and
exclusionary conduct that maintains its monopolies in the Internet Search Market,
the Licensable Mobile Device Operating System Market, the Search Advertising
Market and the Ad Server Market by protecting and raising the barriers to entry.
This illegal conduct restricts consumer choice across the spectrum of services,
advertising, products and product offerings, news, information, comparison
shopping, and web applications; thwarts competition by marginalizing competitors
not owned or controlled by Google; and deters innovation.
1.

Google Leverages its Monopoly Power in the Internet Search,
Internet Search Advertising, and Ad Server Markets and Its
Dominance in the Web Browser Market to Maintain Its
Monopolies and Gain a Monopoly in the Broader Online
Advertising Market.

140. In an attempt to maintain its numerous monopolies and gain monopoly
power in the broader Online Advertising Market, Google has engaged in a number
of anticompetitive, illegal and deceptive practices including:
a.

Bundling or illegally tying the use of Google’s DoubleClick Ad

Server with the real-time bids from Google’s AdX marketplace;
b.

Using the Google Ad Server to control every facet of how ads

end up on websites and smartphone apps (through the Android OS)
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around the world and manipulating this control to preferentially treat
Google’s own stable of products and services in an effort to knock out
competition;
c.

Illegally tying the purchase of ads on YouTube, the world’s

largest video streaming website, with Google’s own ad buying tools –
including Google Ads, AdSense, AdX and now Google Ad Manager –
and making rival tools for placing ads in video streams less attractive
to advertisers because they can only access smaller audiences;
d.

Requiring that publishers and advertisers comply with a host of

arbitrary, Google-set rules in order to allow their online videos to be
enabled, viewable and audible on Google’s dominant Chrome browser;
e.

Making their own advertising products and services more

attractive to users by changing and/or altering algorithms to exempt
Google-owned and Google-preferred platforms, products and services
from the onerous and arbitrary rules that enable online videos to be
viewed and heard by users;
f.

Deceptively phasing out and/or disabling Adobe Flash in favor

of HTML5, while simultaneously providing the antidote to online
advertisers who uploaded their ads through AdWords, AdWords Editor,
or third-party tools that work with Google’s ad platform;
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g.

Tying the Google Search and Google Chrome browser apps to

the Android OS by assuring the pre-installation of these Google apps,
thereby further feeding Google’s preestablished rules and parameters
for enabled, viewable, and audible online video advertisements and use
of HTML5;
h.

Obstructing the development and distribution of competing

online video ads and advertising platforms not approved by Google;
i.

Providing Google customers who use Google’s AdX with a last-

second opportunity to outbid competing advertisers, who are using nonGoogle marketplaces, a practice which is known as “last look”;
j.

Illegally and blatantly tying its stable of advertising services

together by “rebranding” them into the Google Ad Manger;
k.

Usuriously increasing the cost of rival online video platforms’

use of Google’s goods and services, unilaterally terminating contracts
with rival online advertising platforms, and/or expressly or
constructively refusing to deal and/or do business with competitors; and
l.

Deceptively trolling competing online video platforms and

directly contacting their publishing/advertising partners to interfere
with competitors’ contracts and garner additional market share for
Google.
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141. Moreover, with respect to Google ad offerings, Google has insisted on
exclusivity by (1) requiring the website owners that use AdSense not to allow search
ads from Google's competitors to pop-up on the website; (2) requiring premium
placement of a minimum number of Google search ads; (3) requiring the website
owners to allow a minimum number of search ads from Google to be displayed on
the most prominent space on their search results pages; (4) prohibiting competing
search ads from being placed above or next to Google search ads; and (5)
establishing a right to authorize competing ads, by requiring the website owners to
obtain Google's approval before making any changes to display competing search
ads.
142. Google Ads has also imposed obligations that have prevented sellers
and advertisers from managing search advertising campaigns across Google's
AdWords and non-Google advertising services. These obligations include, but are
not limited to, various restrictions in the AdWords API terms and conditions.
143. Google has also engaged in other anticompetitive practices with respect
to Google Ads by setting unreasonably high minimum bids targeted only at
competing products or services in order to foreclose them from meaningful
participation in the Google Ads auction system. In doing so, Google has foreclosed
participation by its competitors, illegally restrained trade, and stifled competition.
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144. Additionally, Google has taken parts of the content of competing sites
and misappropriated such content by placing it in Google’s own search results, to
artificially and falsely inflate its own profile and bolster its own ranking in generic
and specialized search results. When competitors have objected, Google threatens to
remove them entirely from Google’s search results. Additionally, Google has
contractually restricted small businesses from advertising on competing search
platforms.
145. Google has likewise engaged in anticompetitive conduct and selfdealing by, inter alia, prioritizing other Google specialized search services and
affording its own products and services favorable treatment in its general search
algorithms over competing vertical sites; by scraping and stealing the copyrighted
content of rivals’ web content (known as 'scraping') to enhance its position in the
general search results; and placing undue restrictions on advertisers and their video
content.
2. Google Leverages Its Monopoly in Android Operating
System to Maintain Its Monopoly Power and Attempt to
Gain Further Monopoly Power.
146. The Android OS promotes not only Google’s search-engine, but also
its other free services, such as Google Maps and Google Play. This business strategy
disguised by Google’s gratuitous Android offer seeks to maintain its incontestable
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online dominance on both static and mobile search-engine markets, and, with this in
mind, maintains its sponsored links plus traffic-based revenues from advertising.20
147. Google has thus leveraged its monopoly in the Licensable Mobile
Device Operating System Market to maintain its monopoly power. When Google
develops a new version of Android, it publishes the source code online. The openly
accessible Android source code covers basic features of a smart mobile operating
system, but not Google's proprietary Android apps and services.
148. Device manufacturers that wish to obtain Google's proprietary Android
apps and services are required to enter into contracts with Google, as part of which
Google imposes a number of anticompetitive restrictions. Google also entered into
contracts and applied some of these restrictions to certain large mobile network
operators, who can also determine which apps and services are installed on devices
sold to end users. Contractual restrictions that Google has imposed on device
manufacturers and mobile network operators have enabled Google to use Android
as a vehicle to maintain its Internet Search monopoly, while stifling competition.
149. Regarding its Android OS, Google has engaged in a number of
anticompetitive practices including:

20

Google’s Anti-Competitive and Unfair Practices in Digital Leisure Markets,
ANCA D. CHIRITA, http://dro.dur.ac.uk/13657/1/13657.pdf.
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a.

Illegally tying Google’s Search and Google Chrome browser
apps to the Android OS by assuring the pre-installation of these
Google apps;

b.

granting significant financial incentives to some of the largest
device manufacturers (original equipment manufacturers or
“OEMs”) as well as mobile network operators on condition that
they exclusively pre-installed Google Search across their entire
portfolio of Android devices; and

c.

obstructing the development and distribution of competing
Android OS not approved by Google.

150. Google’s tying of its Google Search app and Google Chrome browser
to Android OS maintains its monopoly in Internet Search and Web Browser
dominance. The same reduces the ability of customers to choose among competing
search apps and web browsers applications and app stores because it forces OEMS
and other purchasers to license or acquire the tied combination whether they (or their
customers) want the Google Chrome browser and the attendant Google apps or not.
Google’s tying, which it can accomplish because of its monopoly power in Internet
Search and Licensable Mobile Device Operating Systems, impairs the ability of its
competitors to compete to have their browsers and apps preinstalled on the Android

74

Case 1:19-cv-05362-JPB Document 1 Filed 11/25/19 Page 75 of 103

operating systems and thus substantially forecloses those competitors from an
important channel of distribution.
151. Google has misused and continues to misuse its monopoly power by
requiring other OEMs to agree, as a condition of acquiring a license to the Android
OS, to Google’s exclusionary restrictions.
152. These restrictive agreements also maintain and enhance the importance
of Google’s ability to provide preferential placement of its own advertising revenue
generating products and services.
153. As a result, these restrictions further exclude competing apps from the
most important channels of distribution, substantially reduce app developers
incentives and abilities to innovate and differentiate their products in ways that could
facilitate competition between Google apps and competing apps, and enhance
Google’s ability to use the near ubiquity of its Android OS monopoly to maintain
dominance in both the relevant markets and gain dominance in the broader Online
Advertising Market.
154. Google’s contracts have unreasonably restrained and
unless enjoined will continue to unreasonably restrain competition in the market for
web applications. They artificially increase the share of the market held by Google’s
Android operating system and they threaten to tip the market permanently to Google
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apps, not because customers have freely chosen Google products in a competitive
marketplace, but because of the illegal exercise of monopoly power by Google.
IX.

ANTITRUST HARM
155. Defendants’ conduct goes far beyond aggressive competition.

Defendants’ anticompetitive and predatory actions intend to, and in fact do, exclude
rivals and harm the competitive process. It is willful and is not competition on the
merits.
156. Google’s conduct harms consumers by depriving customers of valid
competitive choice, degrading consumer privacy, degrading quality and variety of
products and services offered to consumers, and stifling innovation.
157. Google’s conduct harms competition, by artificially and unlawfully
reducing and foreclosing competition, foreclosing competitors from meaningfully
participating in purportedly neutral and unbiased competitive processes including
the ad auction and bidding processes, which are in fact skewed and rigged to favor
Google and Google products and services; and surreptitiously altering algorithms
and compatibilities with competing platforms without sufficient notice to allow them
to alter their product to run on the Google platform.
158. Google’s conduct adversely affects competition and innovation,
including by:
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a.

Impairing the incentive of Google’s competitors and potential
competitors to undertake research and development, because
they know that Google will be able to limit the rewards from any
resulting innovation;

b.

Impairing the ability of Googles’ competitors and potential
competitors to obtain financing for research and development;

c.

Inhibiting Google’s competitors that nevertheless succeed in
developing promising innovations from effectively marketing
their improved products to customers;

d.

Reducing the incentive and ability of advertising platforms, web
application developers, and other competitors to innovate and
differentiate their products in ways that will appeal to customers;
and

e.

Reducing competition and the spur to innovation by Google and
others that only competition can provide.

159. The purpose and effect of Defendants’ conduct has been, and if not
restrained will be:
a.

To preclude competition on the merits between competing online
advertisers, publishers seeking advertising space and websites
offering their “real estate” for ad placement;
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b.

To preclude competition on the merits between Google’s search
and browser apps and other apps;

c.

To preclude potential competition between Google’s Android
OS and competing operating systems, other companies, and
software apps whose use is facilitated by bundled Google
products and services, which systems could otherwise choose to
offer competing Internet and advertising platforms;

d.

To extend Google’s numerous monopolies including Internet
Search, Search Advertising, and Ad Server monopolies; and

e.

To maintain Google’s Internet Search, Search Advertising, and
Ad Server monopolies;

f.

To move toward and attain monopoly power in the Web Browser
Market; and

g.

To move toward and attain monopoly power in the colossally
lucrative broader Online Advertising Market.

160. Google’s systematic and predatory conduct across markets in which it
enjoys monopoly power threatens to change the trajectory of digital and online
competition permanently. As has been recognized: "because it can be so difficult
for courts to restore competition once it has been lost, the true cost of exclusion to
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consumer welfare — and its benefit to dominant firms — are likely to be
understated.”21
X.

GOOGLE’S IMPROPER INFLUENCE ON GOVERNMENT
A.

Obama Administration

161. Beginning sometime after its domination of the search and search
advertising markets, Google began to exert its influence on the U.S. government in
order to maintain and increase its monopoly in those areas as well as others. These
attempts to influence politicians improperly were well-established by the time that
former-President Barack Obama was running for his first term in office. Eric
Schmidt, former CEO and Executive Chairman of Google, regularly campaigned for
President Obama as a candidate and even served as a member of his transition team
and technology advisory council.22 On October 20, 2008 the New York Times
reported that “Google Inc. Chief Executive Eric Schmidt will hit the campaign trail
this week on behalf of Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama, signaling
Mr. Schmidt's push for a greater voice in politics while giving the Obama campaign
a boost from a highly desirable constituency.”

21

Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms:
Striking a Better Balance, 72 Antitrust L.J. 3, 33 (2004).
22

https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122446734650049199.
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162. In 2008, Google's PAC, its employees, and their employees' immediate
families gave over $800,000 to Barack Obama's election campaign, making it the
fifth-largest source of funds to the campaign.23 Google similarly offered significant
technical assistance to the Obama campaign. In turn, candidate Obama spent around
$2.8 million in campaign cash on advertising with Google during this campaign,
roughly 80% of the campaign’s online ad spending.24
163. Based on a review of the Obama Administration visitor logs following
the election, Google company representatives visited the Obama White House an
astonishing 427 times between 2009 and 2016. These meetings show about 169
different Google employees meeting 182 different White House officials. Google’s
top lobbyist, Johanna Shelton, visited 128 times, including multiple personal
meetings with President Obama.
164. According to an article published in the Guardian on December 18,
2015 “Google under scrutiny over lobbying influence on Congress and
White House,” by David Smith (quoting an anonymous Washington antitrust
lawyer), “Where Google stops and government starts is hard to tell. They’re backers
of Barack Obama and it’s well known in Washington how it’s done,” said an antitrust

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/google-political-donations-where-companyexecs-put-their-cash/.
24
https://www.forbes.com/2008/05/29/google-obama-advertising-techcx_pco_0529paidcontent.html.
23
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lawyer based in Washington. “I’ve heard instances of Google calling the White
House to say they’re unhappy about appointments. They don’t just buy off
politicians; they buy off the ecosystem, including advocacy groups and thinktanks.”
165. In total, more than 250 people moved from Google and related firms to
the federal government or vice versa during the Obama administration. At the
executive level, a total of 31 different Google executives joined the White House or
different executive advisory boards. And 22 different White House officials went
on to join Google.25
166. For example, Andrew McLaughlin, Google’s head of global public
policy, left Google in 2009 to join the White House as the deputy chief technology
officer. And Michelle Lee, the deputy general counsel at Google, left Google to
become the Commissioner of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, a
position she held from March 2015 until June 2017.
167. The results of these meetings, the placement of officials within the
government and the outpouring of cash and technical assistance has been rewarding
for Google. While certain elements of these activities take place within every level
of government and multiple industries on a regular basis, Google’s concerted efforts

See Mark Swanson, August 9, 2016 “Watchdog: Exposing the Google Obama
Administration Employee Pipeline.”

25
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shown here cross the line into blatant antitrust violations given the sheer magnitude
of their efforts and the overall dramatic anti-competitive effects on the market.
168. In late 2012, a senior attorney in the Federal Trade Commission, Robert
Mahini, took a position as Google’s senior policy counsel. At or around the same
time, Eric Schmidt, the CEO of Google, visited President Obama in the White House
in late 2012. Most importantly, Joshua Wright, a senior counsel at Wilson Sonsini
– Google’s long-time outside counsel – became the Commissioner of the Federal
Trade Commission.
169. By early 2013, and despite a recommendation from the staff of the
Federal Trade Commission that Google’s conduct had resulted and would continue
to result in harm to consumers and innovation on the online search and advertising
markets, Obama’s Federal Trade Commission resolved an anti-competitive inquiry
with a virtual slap on the wrist, avoiding an enforcement action altogether. The
settlement was purportedly to avoid “concerns that these practices could stifle
competition in the markets for popular devices such as smart phones, tablets, and
gaming consoles, as well as the market for online search advertising.”
170. Google’s influence was likewise apparent with the appointment of
Michelle Lee as the Director of the US Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) by
President Obama. Prior to being picked to head the USPTO in 2014, Lee was the
Deputy General Counsel and Head of Patents and Patent Strategy for Google. As
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part of her appointment, she was tasked with implementing the newly founded Patent
Trial and Appeal Board and Inter Partes Review procedures that were established
under the American Invents Act (“AIA”). Commissioner Lee effectively made
Google’s desire to weaken patent protections for everyone but itself into USPTO
policy. This position is one that had been regularly espoused by attorneys dealing
with Google patents in the past.26
171. As Director, Michelle Lee wielded unprecedented power over the
USPTO after the passage of the AIA, one of the greatest areas of power was in her
ability to appoint Administrative Patent Judges (“APJs”) to oversee Inter Partes
Reviews that were established by the AIA.
172. Thus, APJs are purely political positions, since it has no tenure to
ensure the judge’s independence. Unlike most other judges, APJs can be appointed
or removed at the whim of the Director.27 They likewise have their pay dictated by
the director and have no conflicts checks in the cases that they hear, making them
direct and efficient tools for the administration that is in power.
173. Further, the very procedures of the IPRs themselves are designed to
increase the likelihood that patents from smaller inventors will be invalidated. Most

26

https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Google-lawyer-Why-the-patentsystem-is-broken-2324278.php.
27
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/03/21/how-google-and-big-tech-killed-theu-s-patent-system/.
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shockingly, there is no limit on the number of times that a patent may be subjected
to the IPR process. As one of the top filers of IPRs, Google regularly avails itself of
this process. Despite the purported rule against duplicative filings, about 38% of
Googles IPR filings challenge at least one claim that overlaps with another Google
IPR.28
174. While it seeks to prevent or invalidate the patents of others through
USPTO procedures, Google also avails itself of other procedures that work to its
benefit. For example, in 2014, Google was by far the largest recipient of patents that
were expedited under the USPTO’s Track One program, created by the AIA, which
allows companies to get their patent applications “fast-tracked” by paying extra fees,
something that Google has no trouble doing.29
175. A history of using its clout and market position to weaken the value of
potentially competitive patents owned by others—and indeed prevent those patents
from issuing in the first place—while steadily increasing and making use of its own
massive portfolio has become a hallmark of Google.
176. Another example of Google’s manipulation of government policy
during the Obama regime is with the Obama administration’s dismissal of the

https://www.law360.com/articles/1083158.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/google-has-gottenmore-fast-track-patents-than-any-other-company/2014/10/26/b39334b4-594f11e4-b812-38518ae74c67_story.html.
28

29
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Registrar of Copyrights for the first time in 119 years. This dismissal occurred
shortly after she chastised Google for its attempts at abusing and weakening the U.S.
Copyright system.30
B. Google’s Influence on Policy to Maintain Monopoly Power
177. Google’s influence also extends beyond its direct manipulation of the
government through lobbying. It regularly takes a more indirect approach by
funding “research” and opinion papers by professors and other individuals espousing
its views on antitrust issues, data privacy, and patent policy, frequently without
disclosing that they were tied to Google.31
178. Likewise, it continues to expand its patent portfolio and reach through
actions such as its massive cross-license with China’s Tencent search firm,32 a
company that is second only to Google in global patent applications.33
179. Google is further continuing its efforts as a co-founder of the High Tech
Inventors Alliance, an innocuous-sounding organization that exists primarily to
lobby for Google-backed patent policies.34 Similarly, its Patent Purchase Promotion

30

https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/10/24/murder_in_the_library_of_congress/.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidpridham/2017/07/19/how-google-tries-tobuy-government/.
32
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-google-tencent/google-announcespatent-agreement-with-tencent-amid-china-push-idUSKBN1F80DF.
33
https://kr-asia.com/tencent-second-only-to-google-in-global-patent-applications.
34
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/05/22/1510140/0/en/HighTech-Inventors-Alliance-Applauds-BIG-Data-for-IP-of-2018.html
31
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program offers to buy patents from others in order to accumulate and consolidate its
own portfolio.35
C.

Federal Trade Commission

180. Google’s influence over the Federal Trade Commission, its decisions
to allow objectionable acquisitions and its cooperative and collaborative stance with
Google is alarming.
181. On December 20, 2007, after concerns raised about the anticompetitive
nature of the acquisition, the FTC approved Google's purchase of DoubleClick from
its owners Hellman & Friedman and JMI Equity. In doing so, the FTC stated:
“[A]fter carefully reviewing the evidence, we have concluded that Google's
proposed acquisition of DoubleClick is unlikely to substantially lessen
competition.”
182. Later in 2011, the FTC conducted an investigation into allegations that
Google had manipulated its search algorithms to harm vertical websites and unfairly
promote its own competing vertical properties, a practice commonly known as
“search bias.” The FTC looked at Google’s introduction of “Universal Search” – a

https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/07/16/high-tech-inventors-alliance-newestefficient-infringer-lobby/.
35
https://ipcloseup.com/2015/11/17/googles-patent-buying-program-an-apparentsuccess-is-thinly-reported/
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/29/google-announces-the-patent-purchasepromotion/.
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product that prominently displays targeted Google properties in response to specific
categories of searches, such as shopping and travel to determine whether Google
used that product to reduce or eliminate a nascent competitive threat. The
investigation also looked at whether Google altered its search algorithms to demote
certain vertical websites (e.g., Expedia, Orbitz and Yelp) in an effort to reduce or
eliminate a nascent competitive threat.
183. In 2013, following the appointment of former Google outside counsel
Joshua Wright as Obama’s FTC Commissioner and despite a staff memo urging
prosecution, the FTC issued two decisions effectively terminating the investigations
into Google without any meaningful action against Google. According to the
Commission statement, the FTC concluded that the introduction of Universal
Search, as well as additional changes made to Google’s search algorithms – even
those that may have had the effect of harming individual competitors – could be
plausibly justified as innovations that improved Google’s product and the experience
of its users.

Notably, Google’s Internet Search market rose from approximately

70% to now 94% of the market. The FTC staff memo, which had vehemently urged
enforcement action against Google, was later leaked, but no further action was taken.
184. The FTC case was a “false negative” – a mistaken exoneration of
conduct that has harmed and continues to harm competition and consumers. The
cost of this false negative includes not just the failure to condemn Google’s anti87
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competitive conduct, but also the loss to competition and consumers inflicted by
emboldening, rather than deterring, continued anticompetitive conduct by Google
and others. That nearly all state Attorneys General have jointly come together to
investigate Google’s anti-competitive and predatory conduct, below, rings loudly as
a condemnation of the FTC’s 2013 decisions concerning Google under the Obama
Administration.
185. In its 2013 Decisions, the FTC doubled-down on its prior erroneous
decision to permit the DoubleClick acquisition. The dual 2013 decisions of the FTC
are, at best, the bolstering of its prior mistake. At worst, the FTC has been complicit
in Google’s rise to dominance. Thus, this action and the expected action of the 50
Attorneys General must be permitted to go forward and challenge Google’s march
toward total online and information dominance.
XI.

GOOGLE’S PREDATORY CONDUCT IS WELL DOCUMENTED
186. Google’s monopolistic and anticompetitive behavior and activities are

well documented.
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A.

The European Union Commission

187. On November 30, 2010, the EU Commission initiated antitrust
proceedings against Google concerning complaints of the unfavorable treatment by
Google of competing vertical search service providers in Google's unpaid and
sponsored search results coupled with an alleged preferential placement of Google's
own services (the “Google Search Investigation”). The Commission also opened the
investigation into the alleged imposition of exclusivity obligations by Google on its
advertising and distribution partners and suspected restrictions on advertisers as to
the portability of campaign data to competing online advertising platforms (the
“Google AdSense Investigation”). These practices were alleged to have constituted
an infringement of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement.
188. The EU Commission investigated whether Google had abused a
dominant market position in online search by lowering the ranking of unpaid search
results of competing services which are specialized in providing users with specific
online content such as price comparisons (so-called vertical search services, such as
Expedia or Orbitz) and by according preferential placement to the results of its own
vertical search services in order to shut out competing services. The Commission
also looked into allegations that Google lowered the Quality Score, one of the factors
that determine the price paid to Google by advertisers, for sponsored links of
89
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competing vertical search services. The Commission's probe also focused on
allegations that Google imposes exclusivity obligations on advertising partners,
preventing them from placing certain types of competing ads on their web sites, as
well as on computer and software vendors, with the aim of shutting out competing
search tools. Finally, it investigated suspected restrictions on the portability of online
advertising campaign data to competing online advertising platforms.
189. On March 13, 2013, the EU Commission adopted a Preliminary
Assessment addressed to Google under Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
(“Preliminary Assessment”). In the Preliminary Assessment, the Commission took
the view that Google engages in the following business practices that may infringe
Article 102 of the Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement:






The favorable treatment, within Google’s general search results pages,
of links to Google’s own specialized search services as compared to
links to competing specialized search services;
The copying and use by Google without consent of original content
from third-party websites in its own specialized search services;
Agreements that de jure or de facto oblige websites owned by third
parties (referred to in the industry as “publishers”) to obtain all or
most of their online search advertisement requirements from Google;
and
Contractual restrictions on the management and transferability of
online search advertising campaigns across online search advertising
platforms.

190. Notably, the EU Commission stated that: “The fact that a product or
service is provided free of charge does not prevent the offering of such a service
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from constituting an economic activity for the purposes of the competition rules of
the Treaty. This is simply a factor to be taken into account in assessing dominance.”
191. On 15 April 2015, the European Commission initiated formal
antitrust proceedings against Google with regard to its business practices related to
Android (the “Google Android Investigation”).
192. On June 2017, DG COMP, the competition arm of the European
Commission and Europe’s principal antitrust enforcer, concluded the Google Search
Investigation, finding infringement of Article 102, which prohibits the abuse of a
dominant position. The Commission imposed a $2.7 billion fine in the Google
Search Investigation. The Commission also ordered Google to remedy the abuse
within 90 days or face daily penalties of up to 5% of global group turnover. The June
2017 decision was followed by a $ 5.1 billion fine on the Google Android
Investigation in 2018 and a $1.7 billion fine on Google AdSense Investigation in
2019.
B.

United States Department of Justice Inquiries

193. On July 23, 2019, The Department of Justice announced that its
Antitrust Division is reviewing whether and how market-leading online platforms
have achieved market power and are engaging in practices that have reduced
competition, stifled innovation, or otherwise harmed consumers. The Department’s
review is considering the widespread concerns that consumers, businesses, and
91
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entrepreneurs have expressed about search, social media, and some retail services
online. The Department’s Antitrust Division is conferring with and seeking
information from the public, including industry participants who have direct insight
into competition in online platforms, as well as others. “Without the discipline of
meaningful market-based competition, digital platforms may act in ways that are not
responsive to consumer demands,” said Assistant Attorney General Makan
Delrahim of the Antitrust Division. “The Department’s antitrust review will explore
these important issues.” The goal of the Department’s review is to assess the
competitive conditions in the online marketplace in an objective and fair-minded
manner and to ensure Americans have access to free markets in which companies
compete on the merits to provide services that users want. If violations of law are
identified, the Department has indicated that it will proceed appropriately to seek
redress.
C.

September 2019 Announcement of Investigation by State Attorneys General
194. On September 9, 2019, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton

announced that Texas is leading 50 attorneys general in a multistate, bipartisan
investigation of Google’s business practices in accordance with state and federal
antitrust laws. In so announcing AG Paxton acknowledged that there was evidence
that Google’s business practices undermined consumer choice, stifled innovation,
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violated users’ privacy, and put Google in control of the flow and dissemination of
online information.
XII. CLAIMS
COUNT I - VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
(Unreasonable Restraints on Trade)
195. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges every allegation above as if set forth
herein in full.
196. Defendants’ actions, as stated above, have had and are having a
substantial anticompetitive effect on interstate commerce.
197. As described above, Defendants jointly have market power in
Defendants’ Leveraged Markets.
198. Defendants are combinations within the meaning of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
199. Individually and in combination, Defendants’ anticompetitive behavior
constitutes illegal restrictions, agreements, and barriers that are intended to and do
in fact prevent, restrict or interfere with competition in Defendants’ Leveraged
Markets in violation of the Sherman Act.
200. Plaintiff has suffered, continues to suffer, and will suffer until the Court
enters the relief requested below, an antitrust injury resulting from Defendants’
illegal conduct as described herein. The effects of Defendants’ illegal conduct have
resulted in significant monetary injury to Plaintiff, as well as in higher prices paid
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by consumers for retail products, higher prices for advertising, and the forcing of
Plaintiff and others to use Google products and services through improper tying.
Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.
COUNT II - VIOLATION OF SHERMAN ACT SECTION 2 –
(Monopoly Maintenance)
201. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges every allegation above as if set forth
herein in full.
202. Defendants have monopoly power in Defendants’ Leveraged Markets.
Through the anticompetitive conduct described herein, Defendants have willfully
maintained, and unless restrained by the Court, will continue to willfully maintain
that power by anticompetitive, illegal, deceptive, and unreasonably exclusionary
conduct. Defendants have acted with the intent illegally to maintain their monopoly
power in each of Defendants’ Leveraged Markets, and their illegal conduct has
enabled them to do so in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
203. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and practices alleged above,
competition and consumers will continue to be immediately and irreparably injured
through the following:
a.

Loss and degradation to competition in each of the relevant
markets;

b.

Degradation of the quality of products and services offered to the
consumer;
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c.

Degradation of data protection and the privacy rights of
consumers; and

d.

Curtailing and stifling of innovation by would-be competitors.

204. Defendants’ illegal conduct has directly caused significant monetary
damages to Plaintiff. The precise amount of damages Plaintiff is entitled to recover
as a result of the foregoing injuries is substantial and will be fully ascertained at trial.
205. In addition, Defendants’ monopolization of the relevant markets are
ongoing wrongs that cause incalculable and irreparable injury for which there is no
adequate remedy at law. Unless Defendants are enjoined by appropriate Order of
this Court, the asserted harm will continue unabated.
COUNT III - VIOLATION OF SHERMAN ACT SECTION 2 –
(Monopoly Leveraging)
206. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges every allegation above as if set forth
herein in full.
207. Defendants have monopoly power in each of Defendants’ Leveraged
Markets, including but not limited to the Internet Search Market, the Search
Advertising Market, the Market for Licensable Mobile Operating Systems, and the
Ad Server Market.

Through the anticompetitive conduct described herein,

Defendants have leveraged each of these markets in an effort to gain monopoly
power and further dominance in the Web Browser Market and the broader Online
Advertising Market. Defendants have done so willfully and unless restrained by the
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Court, will continue to willfully leverage that power by further anticompetitive,
illegal, deceptive, and unreasonably exclusionary conduct. Defendants have acted
with the intent illegally to maintain and gain monopoly power in each of these
markets, and their illegal conduct has enabled them to do so in violation of Section
2 of the Sherman Act.
208. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and practices alleged above,
competition and consumers will continue to be immediately and irreparably injured
through the following:
a.

Loss and degradation to competition in each of the relevant
markets;

b.

Degradation of the quality of products and services offered to the
consumer;

c.

Degradation of data protection and the privacy rights of
consumers; and

d.

Curtailing and stifling of innovation by would-be competitors.

209. Defendants’ illegal conduct has directly caused significant monetary
damages to Plaintiff. The precise amount of damages Plaintiff is entitled to recover
as a result of the foregoing injuries is substantial and will be fully ascertained at trial.
210. In addition, Defendants’ monopolization of the relevant markets and
monopoly leveraging are ongoing wrongs that cause incalculable and irreparable
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injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law. Unless Defendants are enjoined
by appropriate Order of this Court, the asserted harm will continue unabated.
COUNT IV - VIOLATION OF SHERMAN ACT SECTION 2 –
(Attempted Monopolization)
211. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges every allegation above as if set forth
herein in full.
212. Defendants have attempted to monopolize the Web Browser Market,
and the broader Online Advertising Market, of which the Search Advertising Market
(in which Google already has a monopoly) is a narrower sub-category.
213. Defendants’ anti-competitive conduct has created a dangerous
probability that they will achieve monopoly power in the U.S. for the Web Browser
Market and the broader Online Advertising market.
214. Defendants have a specific intent to achieve monopoly power in the
U.S. Web Browser Market and the broader Online Advertising Market.
215. Defendants have the power to exclude competition in the U.S. Web
Browser Market and the Online Advertising Market, and have used that power,
including by way of their unlawful practices in restraint of trade and monopoly
leveraging as described herein, in an attempt to monopolize these relevant markets.
216. Defendants’ conduct as described herein, including its unlawful
practices in restraint of trade, is exclusionary as respects its competitors in the U.S.
markets for Online Advertising and Web Browsers.
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217. Defendants have combined and leveraged their own monopolies in an
attempt to monopolize the Web Browser and Online Advertising Markets, with the
effect being that competition is foreclosed, that innovation is stifled, and that
consumer choice is gravely diminished.
218. There is no business necessity or other pro-competitive justification for
Defendants’ conduct.
219. Plaintiff has been injured, and will continue to be injured, in their
businesses and property by way of Defendants’ conduct, including by way of
overpaying for goods and services, being shut out of meaningful and fair
participation in advertising exchange, and being foreclosed from competing in the
market on their merits.

COUNT V - VIOLATION OF SHERMAN ACT SECTION 2 and
CLAYTON ACT SECTION 3
(Exclusive Dealing)
220. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges every allegation above as if set forth
herein in full.
221. As detailed above, Google has monopoly power in Defendant’s
Leveraged Monopolies, including the power to control prices and exclude
competition.
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222. Google has willfully and intentionally entered into anti-competitive,
exclusionary, and unjustified agreements with publishers, advertisers, original
equipment manufacturers, and others creating high barriers to entry and unreasonably
excluding competition in the attendant markets.
223. These exclusive dealing agreements are unreasonably restrictive in
terms of breath duration and market coverage.
224. This web of exclusive dealing agreements cannot be justified by any
purportedly procompetitive purpose; thus Google’s exclusive dealing arrangements
agreements are not only unduly restrictive and unreasonable in length, but also serve
the anti-competitive purpose of cutting competitors off from resources they need to
compete with Google.
225. This conduct has substantially foreclosed competition in the relevant
markets.
226. These exclusionary agreements violate both Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 and Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 because these
agreements constitute anti-competitive acts intended to maintain Google’s monopoly
in the Defendant’s Leveraged Markets.
227. As a direct and proximate result of Google’s anti-competitive and
monopolistic conduct, plaintiffs have been damaged in fact.

99

Case 1:19-cv-05362-JPB Document 1 Filed 11/25/19 Page 100 of 103

COUNT VI - TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
228. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges every allegation above as if set forth
herein in full.
229. Plaintiff has had customer contracts and customer relationships with
various advertisers for more than a decade. These customer contracts and customer
relationships are valuable assets of Plaintiff.
230. Without privilege, and without permission, authorization or even
notice, Defendants have acted improperly and wrongfully by, inter alia, approaching
Plaintiff’s customers with the intent to divert those customers from Plaintiff to
Defendants. In so doing, Defendants have used information derived from their
algorithms, which Plaintiff is forced to use to deliver advertisements, in order to
make false or misleading claims to Plaintiff’s customers.
231. Defendants’ actions were done with malice and with the specific intent
to injure Plaintiff.

Defendants’ actions have disrupted Plaintiff’s customer

relationships and future business with such customers.
232.

Defendants’ illegal conduct has directly caused significant monetary

damages to Plaintiff. The precise amount of damages Plaintiff is entitled to recover
as a result of the foregoing injuries is substantial and will be fully ascertained at trial.
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233. Defendants’ actions show willful misconduct, malice, fraud,
wantonness, oppression, and an entire want of care which would raise the
presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.
XIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court enter a final judgment against
each Defendant as follows:
1.

A declaratory judgment finding that Defendants’ Leveraged

Monopolies constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade and are illegal under
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act;
2.

A preliminary, and thereafter permanent, injunction as follows:
(a)

prohibiting each Defendant from engaging in, enforcing,

carrying out, renewing, or attempting to engage in, enforce, carry out or
renew any of the Google Competitive Restraints as alleged herein or any
other similar restraint having a similar purpose or effect in violation of
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq. and Section
3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14;
(b)

imposing certain affirmative obligations on Google

regarding aspects of its corporate governance and corporate mandate,
including requiring Google to sell to, or provide interconnection with,
rivals in each of the relevant markets in order to lower entry barriers;
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(c)

requiring that Defendants be legally separated into

independent corporations to include, but not be limited to: (1) one
separate and independent corporate entity for its flagship Internet search
business; (2) one separate and independent corporate entity for its
Internet advertising business; (3) one separate and independent corporate
entity for its Android mobile operating systems business; (4) one separate
and independent corporate entity for its Ad Server business; and (5) one
separate and independent corporate entity for its Web Browser business;
(d)

requiring that a corporate monitor assist in the breakup or

allocation of business activities between and among the resulting entities
designed to maximize competition and benefit to the consuming public
en masse; that the monitor be empowered to advise the Court as to further
divestment or reallocation of Google assets or further corporate
government changes or board membership changes;
3.

An award of monetary damages, including treble damages, punitive

damages, the costs of this action and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to Sections
4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26;
4.

An award of pre-judgement and post-judgement interest at the highest

legal rate from and after the date of service of this Complaint to the extent provided
by law; and
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5.

An award of such other relief as may be appropriate and as the Court

may deem proper.
XIV. JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues herein.
Respectfully submitted, this 25th day of November, 2019.

HERMAN JONES LLP
/s/ John C. Herman
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cjones@hermanjones.com
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